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I. Introduction
Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, guardianship pro-
ceedings for personal care and/or property management, was
enacted in July, 1992, and became effective on April 1, 1993.1
The statute established a procedure for the appointment of a
guardian, whose powers are limited specifically to the particu-
lar needs of an incapacitated person for personal care, property
and financial management, or both.2
The most difficult task in guardianship proceedings is find-
ing professionals to participate as court evaluators, counsel and
guardians.3 There is also considerable controversy over the ap-
pointment of both a court evaluator and counsel, since the pay-
ment of compensation to both potentially exhausts the
resources of the alleged incapacitated person [AIP]. 4 In fact, re-
1. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1993) [hereinafter "Arti-
cle 81"]. See also Rose Mary Bailly, Introduction to Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene
Law Guardianship for Personal Care and/or Property Management, in ARTICLE 81
OF THE MENTAL HYGIENE LAW 3, 3 (New York State Bar Ass'n, 1991) [hereinafter
"Bailly I"].
2. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
3. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq. Principal Law Clerk, Tax Certio-
rari and Guardianship Parts, in White Plains, N.Y. (Oct. 26, 1995).
4. See Wallace L. Leinheardt, Article 81-How's It Doing?, in ELDER LAW
Arr'y, 23, 23 (Spring 1995). The alleged incapacitated person [hereinafter "AIP"] is
the person against whom the proceeding is brought, whereby the petitioner seeks
the appointment of a guardian. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81 (McKinney Supp.
1993).
There are two components to a determination of incapacity: 1) the person
cannot understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of the per-
son's particular inabilities; and 2) the person is likely to suffer harm because
of these limitations and the inability to appreciate the consequences of the
limitations. This standard does away with the labels of incompetency and
substantial impairment in Articles 77 and 78 and their requirement of some
underlying illness or condition.
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cent decisions and the opinion of some elder law attorneys indi-
cate the belief that the appointment of counsel is often
sufficient. 5
Additionally, Article 81 fails to make any provision for com-
pensation for the services of such professionals if the AIP is in-
digent.6 Finally, since many of those involved (judges,
practitioners, and the AiP) are concerned about the great ex-
pense involved in these proceedings, the finding and implemen-
tation of ways to decrease costs would be beneficial. This
Comment will address the problems associated with the ap-
pointment of the various professionals involved in Article 81
proceedings. 7
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of Article 81,
the roles of the various professionals involved, and the difficul-
ties that arise during the course of these proceedings. Part III
introduces potential solutions to the problems inherent in Arti-
cle 81, such as finding professionals to participate when an AIP
is indigent, eliminating excessive legal fees, and reducing the
costs of these proceedings. Part IV concludes with suggestions
for the New York State Legislature to consider for improvement
of Article 81. Some proposals for betterment are as follows:
continuing education to inform attorneys of the need for their
services, mandatory pro bono hours to ensure attorney repre-
sentation of indigents, and dispensing with the appointment of
a court evaluator in certain instances when counsel is ap-
pointed, in order to reduce the costs of these proceedings.
II. Background
A. The History of Article 81 Proceedings
Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, proceedings for ap-
pointment of a guardian for personal needs or property manage-
ment, became effective on April 1, 1993.8 Article 81 replaced
5. In re Rochester General Hosp., 158 Misc. 2d 522, 525, 601 N.Y.S.2d 375,
378 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1993); In re Heumann, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 17, 1993, at 29
col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993); In re Sulzberger, 159 Misc. 2d 236, 603
N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993). See also Leinheardt, supra note 4, at
23.
6. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
7. See id.
8. See id. § 81.01.
4471997]
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Articles 77 and 789 because of the inflexibility of the dual struc-
ture of the conservatorship 0 and committee" system in meet-
ing the unique needs of persons with incapacities. 12
Prior to 1972, no conservatorship law existed in New York
State. 13 The appointment of a committee, pursuant to Article
78 of the Mental Hygiene Law,' 4 was the only available legal
remedy to handle the needs of an alleged incompetent. 5 How-
ever, the committee statute required a finding of complete in-
competence.' 6 Because of the stigma and loss of civil rights
accompanying such a finding, the judiciary became reluctant to
invoke the committee statute.' 7
9. See id. §§ 77 and 78 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1, 1993).
10. "A conservator is one appointed by the court to manage [the] affairs of [an]
incompetent or to liquidate business or person appointed by [the] court to manage
the estate of one who is unable to manage property and business affairs effec-
tively." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 306 (6th ed. 1990).
Under Article 77, the court had the power to appoint one or more conserva-
tors of the property (a) for a resident who has not been judicially declared
incompetent and who by reason of advanced age, illness, infirmity, mental
weakness, alcohol abuse, addiction to drugs, or other cause, has suffered
substantial impairment of his ability to care for his property or has become
unable to provide for himself or others dependent upon him for his
support....
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 77.01 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1, 1993).
11. "A committee is a person . .. to whom the ... management of any matter
is committed or referred, as by a court or legislature." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY
273 (6th ed. 1990). Under Article 78,
[T]he court shall preserve the property of a person it declared incompetent
or of a patient who has been found to be unable adequately to conduct his
personal or business affairs from waste or destruction and, out of the pro-
ceeds thereof, provides for the payment of his debts and for the safekeeping,
support and maintenance, and the education, when required, of the incom-
petent and his family.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 78.01 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1, 1993). In exer-
cising such custody, the court may appoint a committee of the person or a commit-
tee of the property who may be the same or different individuals. See id.
12. See Bailly I, supra note 1, at 4-5.
13. See G. Oliver Koppell & Kenneth J. Munnelly, The New Guardian Statute:
Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, N.Y. ST. B. J., Feb. 1993, at 16.
14. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 78.03 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1,
1993).
15. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16.
16. See id. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 78.03 (McKinney 1988) (repealed
April 1, 1993).
17. See Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16; See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAw § 81.01 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
448
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In 1972, the New York State Legislature enacted a conser-
vatorship statute as a less restrictive alternative to the commit-
tee procedure.'8  Unlike the committee procedure, the
appointment of a conservator did not require a finding of incom-
petence. 19 However, the conservatorship statute was designed
only to deal with the AIP's property and financial matters.20
In 1974, the New York State Legislature passed two
amendments, attempting to expand the role of conservators by
substituting the conservatorship procedure for the committee
procedure. 21 The first amendment established a statutory pref-
erence for the appointment of a conservator in both Articles 77
and 78.22 The second amendment allowed the conservator to as-
sume a limited role to protect the personal well-being of the con-
servatee. 23 These amendments contributed to the "legal
18. See 1972 Laws 251; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 77 (McKinney 1988) (re-
pealed April 1, 1993); Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16.
19. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 77 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1,
1993); Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16.
20. See Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16; N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 77.19 (McKinney 1988) (repealed April 1, 1993); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.01
(McKinney Supp. 1993).
21. See Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16; 1974 N.Y. Laws 277; 1974
N.Y. Laws 623.
22. See Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16; The Mental Hygiene Law
was amended to add § 78.02, which reads as follows:
Prior to appointment of a committee under this article, it shall be the duty of
the court to consider whether the interests sought to be protected could best
be served by the appointment of a conservator. The court shall not make a
finding that a person is incompetent or is a patient who is unable ade-
quately to conduct his personal or business affairs unless the court first de-
termines that it would not be in such person's best interests to treat him as
suffering substantial impairment under Article 77 of this chapter.
1974 N.Y. Laws 297. Section 77.04 was also added and reads as follows:
[Tihe court may treat a petition for declaration of incompetency and ap-
pointment of a committee under article seventy-eight of this chapter as a
petition for the appointment of a conservator.
Id.
23. See Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16; 1974 N.Y. Laws 623. Sec-
tion 77.19 of the Mental Hygiene Law was amended to read as follows:
[Tihe court order appointing a conservator shall set forth (1) the duration of
the conservatorship; (2) the extent of income and assets of the proposed con-
servatee which are to be placed under the conservatorship; and (3) the court
approved plan for the preservation, maintenance, and care of the con-
servatee's income, assets and personal well-being, including the provision of
necessary personal and social protective services to the conservatee.
5
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blurring between Articles 77 and 78," such that alterations in
the Mental Hygiene Law would have to be made if guardianship
proceedings were ever to be effective. 24
In 1991, the New York Court of Appeals decided In re
Grinker,25 holding that Article 77 did not authorize a court to
grant a conservator the power to commit the conservatee to a
nursing home, and that such power can be granted only pursu-
ant to Article 78, the committee statute.26 This decision "settled
the debate that had surrounded Article 77 regarding whether a
conservator can be granted the power to make decisions con-
cerning the person of the conservatee, and thus significantly
clarified the distinction between the conservator and committee
statutes."27 Unfortunately, the decision "dramatized the very
difficulty the courts were trying to resolve, namely, choosing be-
tween a remedy which governs property and finances or a rem-
edy which judges a person completely incompetent."28
Pursuant to the inherent problems surrounding Articles 77
and 78, the New York State Law Revision Commission proposed
the creation of a single statute, with a standard for guardian
appointment focused on the individual's needs. 29 The result of
these efforts was Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law, which
are guardianship proceedings for personal care and/or property
management.30
1974 N.Y. Laws 623. Section 77.21 of the Mental Hygiene Law was amended to
read "to the extent of the net estate available therefore, a conservator shall provide
for the maintenance, support, and personal well-being of the conservatee..." Id.
Any references to "personal well-being" in the above sections were new. See id.
24. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16.
25. 77 N.Y.2d 703, 573 N.E.2d 536, 570 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1991).
26. See id. at 710, 573 N.E.2d at 539, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
27. Koppell & Munnelly, supra note 13, at 16.
28. Id. at 17.
29. See id.
30. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81 (McKinney Supp. 1993); 1992 N.Y. Laws 698.
Article 81 was enacted to:
amend the Mental Hygiene Law in relation to the appointment of guardians
for personal needs and property management for persons who are likely to
suffer harm because they are unable to provide for personal needs including
food, shelter, health care, or safety and/or unable to manage property and
financial affairs in repealing certain provisions of such law relating thereto.
1992 N.Y. Laws 698.
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Article 81 established a procedure3' for the appointment of
a guardian whose powers are specifically tailored to the needs of
an incapacitated person for personal care or property manage-
ment.3 2 A guardian's powers are limited to ensure the "least re-
strictive form of intervention which assists them in meeting
their needs but, at the same time, permits them to exercise the
independence and self-determination of which they are capa-
ble."3 3 The New York Legislature mandated that the New York
State Law Revision Commission monitor the guardianship law
for three years ending in April, 1996, and at that time, report to
the Governor and the Legislature on the effectiveness of Article
81 together with recommendations regarding its modification. 34
On May 23, 1996, Senator Nicholas Spano introduced a bill to
amend Article 81;35 this Comment will delineate the changes
proposed where relevant to this article.
31. Under § 81.02,
[Tihe court may appoint a guardian for a person if the court determines: (1)
that the appointment is necessary to provide for the personal needs of that
person, including food, clothing, shelter, health care, or safety and/or to
manage the property and financial affairs of that person; and (2) that the
person agrees to the appointment, or that the person is incapacitated ....
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.02 (McKinney Supp. 1993). "In deciding whether the
appointment is necessary, the court shall consider the report of the court evaluator
... and the sufficiency and the reliability of available resources.., to provide for
personal needs or property management without the appointment of a guardian."
Id. "Any guardian appointed under this article, shall be granted only those powers
which are necessary to provide for personal needs and/or property management of
the incapacitated person in such a manner as appropriate to the individual and
which shall constitute the least restrictive form of intervention. .. ." Id.
32. See id. § 81.01.
33. Id.
34. See 1992 N.Y. Laws 698. Groups including the Office of Court Administra-
tion, the Elder Law Section of the New York State Bar Association, the Mental
Hygiene Legal Service, Brookdale Institute on Law & Rights of Older Adults, the
Department of Social Services, and the Human Resources Administration of the
City of New York, have been reviewing the implementation of the statute since its
inception. See also Rose Mary Bailly, Proposed Legislative Changes, in ADVANCED
ISSUES IN GUARDIANSHIP 263, 263 n.2 (New York State Bar Ass'n, 1995) [hereinaf-
ter "Bailly II]. On March 10, 1995, the Commission's staff was terminated as part
of a budget proposal to abolish the Commission. Id. Nevertheless, the Elder Law
Section of the New York State Bar Association, as well as Brookdale, the Human
Resource Administration of the City of New York and the Office of Court Adminis-
tration remain committed to improving the effectiveness of the guardianship stat-
ute. Id.
35. See 1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess. (1996).
7
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B. The Roles of Court Evaluator, Counsel and Guardian
1. Court Evaluator
Section 81.09 requires that the court appoint a court evalu-
ator36 at the time of issuance of the order to show cause.3 7
Under section 81.09(b)(1):
the court may appoint as court evaluator any person drawn from
a list maintained by the office of court administration with knowl-
edge of property management, personal care skills, the problems
associated with disabilities, and the private and public resources
available for the type of limitations the person is alleged to have,
including, but not limited to, an attorney-at-law, physician, psy-
chologist, accountant, social worker, or nurse.38
36. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
The duties of the court evaluator shall include the following: (1) meeting,
interviewing, and consulting with the [AlP]; (2) explaining to the [AIP], in a
manner which the person can reasonably be expected to understand, the
nature and possible consequences of the proceeding, the general powers and
duties of a guardian, available resources, and the rights to which the person
is entitled, including the right to counsel; (3) determining whether the [AIP]
wishes legal counsel to be appointed and otherwise evaluating whether legal
counsel should be appointed; (4) interviewing the petitioner, or, if the peti-
tioner is a facility or government agency, a person within the facility or
agency fully familiar with the person's conditions, affairs and situation; and
(5) investigating and making a written report and recommendations to the
court... [which] shall include the court evaluator's personal observations as
to ... the [AIP's] condition, affairs and situation.
Id. The bill presented by the Senate on May 23, 1996 would amend § 81.09(c)(3) as
follows: "determining whether the [AlP] wishes legal counsel to be appointed and
otherwise evaluating whether legal counsel of his or her own choice to be ap-
pointed and otherwise evaluating whether legal counsel should be appointed in
accordance with § 81.10 of this Article." 1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess. (1996).
37. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
38. Id. The bill introduced by the Senate on May 23, 1996 amends this section
to read as follows:
the court may appoint as court evaluator any person, the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service or a not-for-profit corporation. The court evaluator must have
completed the education requirements of § 81.39 of this Article [Guardian
Education Requirements] and the name of the court evaluator must be
drawn from a list maintained by the office of court administration.
1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess. (1996). In essence, the amendment would specifi-
cally authorize the Mental Hygiene Legal Service to be appointed as court evalu-
ator. See id. Furthermore, the amendment would compel the court evaluator to
have the same educational requirements as required of a guardian. See id. See
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.39 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss2/5
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The Law Revision Committee Comments explain that the
choice of court evaluator must be made in light of the fact that
each case presents unique challenges and needs that cannot al-
ways be met by the same type of professional. 39 The court
evaluator is "intended to act as an independent investigator to
gather information to aid the court in reaching a determination
about the person's capacity, the availability and reliability of
alternative resources, assigning the proper powers to the guard-
ian, and selecting the guardian."40
Attorney Charles F. Devlin, Principal Law Clerk for the
Tax Certiorari and Guardianship Parts of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York in White Plains,41 explained that the
most difficult task in guardianship proceedings is finding re-
sources to act as either court evaluator or court-appointed coun-
sel.42 Pursuant to section 81.09, the court must appoint a court
evaluator at the time of the issuance of the order to show
cause. 43 The court chooses from a list of approved fiduciaries
produced by the Office of Court Administration. 44 The court
39. See LAw REviSION COMMISSION COMMENTS, reprinted in the notes to N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.09 (McKinney Supp. 1993)[hereinafter L.R.C. COMM. with
a reference to the notes under which section the commentary appears].
40. Id. See In re Lichtenstein, 223 A.D.2d 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1996) (hold-
ing the court evaluator's investigation and report inadequate where evaluator
failed to make personal assessment of AIP's wishes, failed to make recommenda-
tions on appointment of counsel, failed to interview petitioner, neglected to report
on AIP's physical and financial condition, and failed to analyze AIP's appreciation
of her own limitations).
41. There is a districtwide Guardianship Part for the Ninth Judicial District
(Counties of Westchester, Putnam, Dutchess, Rockland and Orange) that super-
vises the annual and final accountings of all guardianships in the district. See
interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3. The districtwide Guardian-
ship Part for the Ninth Judicial District handles the initial petitions for guardian-
ship in Westchester; in the remaining four counties, the initial hearings are heard
usually by the Surrogate Court. See id. Previously, under Articles 77 and 78, the
Conservatorship and Incompetency Part in White Plains handled every aspect of
the conservatorship and incompetency hearings for all five counties. See id. With
Article 81.07's requirement that the court set a date no more than 28 days from the
date of the filing of the petition on which the order to show cause is returnable,
time constraints necessitated each county to conduct its own initial hearings. See
id.
42. See Interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
43. See id.
44. The list maintained by the office of court administration contains the
name, address and telephone number of lawyers, social workers, accountants, psy-
chologists and other professionals eligible to serve as court evaluator, guardian or
9
PACE LAW REVIEW
then contacts (usually by telephone) the proposed evaluator
best suited to evaluate the AIP's situation, and asks this person
to participate as court evaluator. 45
At the time of the issuance of the order to show cause, the
court is given a sense of the AIP's needs from the petition.4 It
is the general practice in the Ninth Judicial District to appoint
attorneys as court evaluators.47 Nevertheless, attorneys are not
exclusively appointed. 48 Specialized circumstances often recom-
mend appointment of specialized professionals. 49 Unless the
statute mandates otherwise,50 the court then usually awaits the
court evaluator's interview with the AIP and any report by the
court evaluator that the AIP requests counsel to be appointed. 51
2. Counsel
Section 81.10(c) requires that the court appoint counsel
when the AIP: (1) requests counsel, (2) wishes to contest the
petition, (3) does not consent to the authority requested in the
petition to move the person from where he or she presently re-
sides to a nursing home or other similar facility or (4) does not
consent to needed major medical or dental treatment.52 Other
situations where the court must appoint counsel are when the
petition requests temporary powers, the court determines a pos-
sible conflict of interest, or any other time the court deems coun-
sel would be helpful.53
counsel for the AIP. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3; N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(b)(1).
45. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3. For example, if
the problem is financial, an attorney might be appointed as court evaluator; con-
versely, if the AIP has functional disabilities, a social worker might be appointed.
50. See infra part II.B.2.
51. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
52. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993). See In re
Lichtenstein, 223 A.D.2d 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1996) (holding that the appoint-
ment of counsel for the AIP was required given that the AIP contested the appoint-
ment of the petitioner as guardian, and opposed a move to another nursing home).
53. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993). The bill
introduced by the Senate on May 23, 1996 proposes to amend § 81.10(c) as follows:
"[t]he court shall appoint counsel in any of the following circumstances if the court
has no reason to believe that the [AIP] is represented..." 1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601,
Reg. Sess. (1996).
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The attorney representing an AIP is often faced with the
dilemma of how to represent a client who is presumed compe-
tent at law but truly does not understand the nature or conse-
quences of the litigation.54 Because of this dilemma, some
members of the legal profession believe section 81.10, which de-
fines the role of court-appointed counsel, should be clarified. 55
They find it problematic that the section seems to require that a
court-appointed attorney follow the wishes expressed by the cli-
ent no matter how impaired that client may be.5 6 For example,
as a zealous advocate, 57 one would think that because of the ad-
versarial nature of proceedings, the AIP's attorney would try to
prevent the appointment of a guardian.58 In other words, an
AIP should be entitled to have counsel present to contest the
proceeding, regardless of whether a guardian should in fact be
appointed.
However, some attorneys feel that contesting the proceed-
ing may not be in the best interests of the AIP, in that if the AIP
is clearly incapacitated, counsel should not represent the AIP in
the role of zealous advocate. 59 The AIP might require some
form of assistance in meeting his or her personal or property
management needs, whereby the lack of guardian appointment
would work a substantial hardship on the AIP.60 To avoid such
a detrimental effect, some attorneys believe that counsel for an
AIP who is unable to make responsible decisions on his or her
own behalf should be a zealous advocate for the least restrictive
form of intervention, as opposed to a zealous advocate com-
pletely contesting the appointment of a guardian.61
54. Anne K Pecora, Representing Defendants in Guardianship Proceedings:
The Attorney's Dilemma of Conflicting Responsibilities, 1 ELDER L.J. 139, 174
(1993).
55. Leinheardt, supra note 4, at 24.
56. See id.
57. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct assert, "[a]s advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Preamble (1983).
58. As reported by an Interview with Frances M. Pantaleo, Esq., Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Law at Pace University School of Law, who teaches Legal Problems of the
Elderly, in White Plains, N.Y. (Nov. 6, 1995). This information is based upon de-
bate among members of the Elder Law Section of the New York State Bar
Association.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Pecora, supra note 54, at 166.
1997] 455
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Clarification as to the role of counsel is needed, either
under the statute or under the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity.62 Although courts charge lawyers with the highest stan-
dard of advocacy when representing individuals unable to
comprehend the nature of the guardianship proceeding, the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and the Ethical Considerations63 give little guidance to the
attorney representing an AIP.64 Ethical Consideration 7-1265
states,
[a]ny mental or physical condition of a client that renders him
incapable of making a considered judgment on his own behalf
casts additional responsibilities upon his [or her] lawyer .... If
the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his [or her] client, the
lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act
with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his [or her]
client. 66
Under ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14(a), 67
"[w]hen a client's ability to make adequately considered deci-
sions in connection with the representation is impaired,
whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other
reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain
a normal client-lawyer relationship with the client."68 The com-
ments to the rule explain that the normal client-lawyer rela-
tionship is based on the assumption that the client, when
properly advised and assisted, is capable of making decisions
about important matters.69 However, when the client suffers
from a mental disorder or disability, maintaining the ordinary
client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all respects.70
The comments stress that despite a disability, a client lacking
legal competence often has the ability to understand, deliberate
62. See Leinheardt, supra note 4, at 24; Interview with Frances M. Pantaleo,
Esq., supra note 58.
63. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1981).
64. Pecora, supra note 54, at 160.
65. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1981).
66. Id.
67. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) (1983).
68. Id.
69. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14(a) cmt. (1983).
70. See id.
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upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's
own well-being.71
3. Guardian
Under section 81.02(a) of the Mental Hygiene Law, the
court may appoint a guardian 72 for a person if the court
determines:
1) that the appointment is necessary to provide for the personal
needs of that person, including food, clothing, shelter, health care,
or safety and/or to manage the property and financial affairs of
that person; and 2) that the person agrees to the appointment, or
that the person is incapacitated as defined in subdivision (b) of
this section. 73
In most cases, the petitioner is a relative of the AIP and wants
to be appointed as guardian.7 4 In descending order of fre-
quency, the next most common petitioners are: the Department
of Social Service, 75 a hospital or nursing home, 76 or concerned
71. See id.
72. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.03 (McKinney Supp. 1993). A guardian is:
a person who is eighteen years of age or older, a corporation, or a public
agency, including a local department of social services, appointed in accord-
ance with terms of this article by the supreme court, the surrogate's court,
or the county court to act on behalf of an incapacitated person in providing
for personal needs and/or property management.
Id.
73. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.02(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993). Under
§ 81.02(b),
the determination of incapacity shall be based on clear and convincing evi-
dence and shall consist of a determination that a person is likely to suffer
harm because: 1) the person is unable to provide for personal needs and/or
property management; and 2) the person cannot adequately understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability.
Id.
74. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3. See, e.g., In re
Lichtenstein, 223 A.D.2d 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dep't 1996); In re O'Hear, 219
A.D.2d 720, 631 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1995); In re Claiman, 646 N.Y.S.2d 940
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1996); In re Nhan Thi Thanh Le, 168 Misc. 2d 384, 637
N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995); In re Sulzberger, 159 Misc. 2d 236,
603 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993). The relative seeking appointment
of a guardian for an AIP does not always seek the role of guardian for him/herself.
See In re Maher, 207 A.D.2d 133, 621 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2d Dep't 1994); In re Marmol,
168 Misc. 2d 845, 640 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1996); In re Kustka, 163
Misc. 2d 694, 622 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1994).
75. See, e.g., In re Hammons (McCarthy), 168 Misc. 2d 874, 645 N.Y.S.2d 392
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1996); In re Commissioner of Cayuga County Dep't of
13
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neighbors or friends.77 In cases where the Department of Social
Service is the petitioner, the AIP usually has no next of kin and
is indigent; therefore, if no one comes forward at the hearing to
be guardian, the court must appoint one. 78 In such a case, the
guardian is chosen from the list of approved fiduciaries.7 9
Under Article 81, a guardian's powers are specifically lim-
ited to allow the AiP to retain as much independence as is feasi-
ble.80 Whether the guardian is appointed for personal care and/
or property management, according to section 81.20, his or her
duty to "afford the [AIPI the greatest amount of independence
and self-determination ... in light of that person's functional
level, understanding and appreciation of his or her functional
limitations, and personal wishes, preferences and desires with
regard to managing the activities of daily living" is constant.81
Even when a proposed act by a guardian on behalf of an AIP
may be in the AIP's best interests, if the specific power is not
Social Services, 639 N.Y.S.2d 234 (4th Dep't 1996); In re Hammons (Ehmke), 164
Misc. 2d 609, 625 N.Y.S.2d 408 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995); In re Wingate, 627
N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1995); In re Onondaga County Dep't of So-
cial Services, 162 Misc. 2d 733, 619 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County
1994).
76. See, e.g., In re Lula "XX, 637 N.Y.S.2d 234 (4th Dep't 1996); In re Rimler,
164 Misc. 2d 403, 625 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995); In re Janczak,
634 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. Ontario County 1995); In re Chachkers, 159 Misc. 2d
912, 606 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993); In re Rochester General Hospi-
tal, 158 Misc. 2d 522, 601 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1993); In re St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 159 Misc. 2d 932, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1993), affd, 640 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), affd, No. 259, 1996 WL
730469 (N.Y. Dec. 20, 1996).
77. See Interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3. See, e.g., In re
Saphier, 17 Misc. 2d 130, 637 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
78. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
79. See id.; see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
80. Under § 81.20(a),
(1) a guardian shall exercise only those powers that the guardian is author-
ized to exercise by court order; (2) a guardian shall exercise the utmost care
and diligence when acting on behalf of the incapacitated person; (3) a guard-
ian shall exhibit the utmost degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in relation to
the incapacitated person; (4) a guardian shall file an initial and annual re-
ports in accordance with sections 81.30 and 81.31 of this article; (5) a guard-
ian shall visit the incapacitated person not less than four times a year or
more frequently as specified in the court order ....
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.20(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
81. Id.
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authorized by the order of appointment, a court will not expand
that guardian's powers to include the proposed act.
There have been numerous cases where a court has
checked the ability of an appointed guardian to augment his or
her powers. For example, in In re Gordon,8 2 the court denied
the petitioner's request for powers to compel his spouse, the
AIP, to receive psychiatric treatment and administration of an-
tipsychotic drugs without her consent.83 Pursuant to section
81.22(b), whereby "[n]o guardian may: (1) consent to the volun-
tary formal or informal admission of the [AiP] to a mental hy-
giene facility..." the court found that the petitioner could not
consent to such medical intervention against the AIP's will.84
The court therefore determined that the only available remedy
for the relief requested would be involuntary commitment pur-
suant to Article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law8 5 and an applica-
tion for administration of medication.8 6
In the similar case of In re Beth Israel Medical Center,87 the
court denied a guardian's motion for an order of the court di-
recting the police department to assist in transporting an AIP
to the hospital against her wishes based upon the guardian's
determination of the need for evaluation for psychotropic medi-
cation.8 In this case, the appointed guardian was directed to
arrange for twenty-four hour home care of the AIP, who suf-
fered from degenerative dementia.8 9 The guardian was also au-
thorized to consent or refuse routine and major medical
treatment without the AIP's consent. 90 Due to the AIP's refusal
to allow home care attendants to assist her, which included en-
counters wherein the AIP was even violent, the guardian
sought the advice of a psychiatrist, because she feared that
under such adverse conditions, she would soon be unable to find
a companion willing to stay with the AIP.91 The psychiatrist
82. 162 Misc. 2d 697, 619 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 1994).
83. See id. at 698, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
84. See id. at 699, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
85. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.27 (McKinney 1996).
86. See Gordon, 162 Misc. 2d at 700, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
87. 163 Misc. 2d 26, 619 N.Y.S.2d 239 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1994).
88. See id. at 26, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
89. See id. at 26, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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recommended that she bring the AIP to the hospital for an eval-
uation regarding the administration of Haldol, a psychotropic
medication.9 2
As the AIP refused to go to the hospital voluntarily, the
guardian sought an order to direct the police department to as-
sist in bringing the AIP to the hospital for an evaluation.9 3
The court sympathized with the guardian's situation, in that
the short hospital stay would not be the same as an involuntary
commitment under Article 9.94 However, pursuant to an analy-
sis similar to that in Gordon, the court found that since such
action would be against the AIP's will, section 81.22(b)(1) 95 pre-
vented it from granting the relief requested.9 6
Finally, in In re Barsky,97 the court denied a guardian's ex
parte application for an order modifying and expanding his
powers to withhold life-sustaining treatment from an AiP.98 A
heart attack or stroke suffered by the AIP had rendered her in-
capable of ingesting solid food.99 Despite the medical recom-
mendation that a nutrition and hydration tube be surgically
inserted into the AIP's stomach, the guardian claimed he would
not consent to the procedure, based upon conversations he had
previously had with the AIP indicating that she would not de-
sire such treatment. 10 0
The court acknowledged that as guardian for the property
management and personal needs of the AIP, this guardian pos-
sessed the broad powers set forth in section 81.22(a)(8), which
includes the power to
consent to or refuse generally accepted routine or major medical
or dental treatment; the guardian shall make treatment decisions
... in accordance with the patient's wishes, including the pa-
tient's religious and moral beliefs, or if the patient's wishes are
92. See id.
93. See id. at 26, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
94. See id. at 26, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
95. Under § 81.22(b), "[n]o guardian may: (1) consent to the voluntary formal
or informal admission of the [AIP] to a mental hygiene facility under article nine or
fifteen of this chapter..." N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.22(b) (McKinney Supp.
1993).
96. See Gordon, 162 Misc. 2d at 698, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 241-42.
97. 165 Misc. 2d 175, 627 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1995).
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
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not known and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence,
in accordance with the person's best interests, including a consid-
eration of the dignity and uniqueness of every person, the possi-
bility and extent of preserving the person's life, the preservation,
improvement or restoration of the person's health or functioning,
the relief of the person's suffering, the adverse side effects associ-
ated with the treatment, any less intrusive alternative treat-
ments, and such other concerns and values as a reasonable person
in the [AIP's] circumstances would wish to consider. 101
Furthermore, the court quoted section 81.29(e) which
provides:
[n]othing in this article shall be construed either to prohibit a
court from granting, or to authorize a court to grant, to any per-
son the power to give consent for the withholding or withdrawal of
life sustaining treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion. . . . When used in this article, life sustaining treatment
means medical treatment which is sustaining life functions and
without which, according to reasonable medical judgment, that
patient will die within a relatively short time period. '0 2
Nevertheless, the court also noted that the Law Revision Com-
mission Comments to this section state:
Article 81 does not change the current law in New York regarding
whether a guardian has the authority to make decisions regard-
ing the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
nor does it impede the development of the law in this area....
Under present New York law, the right to decline treatment is a
personal one whose exercise has been denied to a third party
when the patient is unable to do so unless a health care proxy or
Do Not Resuscitate Order is in place or there is otherwise clear
and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes regarding such
treatment expressed while the patient was competent. 03
101. Id; See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.22(a)(8) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
The bill presented by the Senate on May 23, 1996 proposes to change this section
as follows: "consent to or refuse generally accepted routine or major medical or
dental treatment subject to the provisions of subdivision (e) of § 81.29 of this Arti-
cle .... " 1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess. (1996). Thus, the change will mandate
that § 81.22(a)(8) be read in conjunction with the provisions of § 81.29(e).
102. Barsky, 165 Misc. 2d at 175, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 904; N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAw § 81.29(e) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
103. Barsky, 165 Misc. 2d at 175, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 904; See L.R.C. Comm.,
supra note 39, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.29 cmts. (McKinney
Supp. 1993).
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The guardian in this proceeding was unable to provide clear
and convincing evidence of the AIP's wishes while she was com-
petent, providing only an affidavit containing a conclusory as-
sertion that the treatment would not be the AIP's desire. 0 4
Therefore, the court denied his application for an expansion of
powers to include the power to determine whether life-sus-
taining treatment should be provided or withheld. 10 5
C. The Controversy Over the Necessity of Both Court
Evaluator and Counsel
Active practitioners in Article 81 proceedings have ex-
pressed concern over the necessity of both court evaluator and
counsel. 10 6 Some elder law attorneys believe that section
81.10(c), 10 7 which describes the mandatory appointment of
counsel, substantially increases the cost of the proceedings un-
necessarily. 08 They feel that counsel should not be appointed
unless there is a prima facie showing that there is a role for
counsel in the proceeding 0 9 For example, if the AIP is able to
provide counsel with some direction and where the AIP opposes
some portion or all of the application and expresses a desire to
have counsel, then counsel should be appointed for the AIP.110
In the alternative, the court should be permitted, at its discre-
tion, to appoint counsel when it deems such appointment
appropriate."'
104. Barsky, 165 Misc. 2d at 175, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
105. See id.
106. See Leinheardt, supra note 4, at 23.
107. Under section 81.10(c):
the court shall appoint counsel in any of the following circumstances: (1) the
[AIP] requests counsel; (2) the [AIP] wishes to contest the petition (3) the
[AIP] does not consent to the authority requested in the petition to move the
[AIP] from where that person presently resides to a nursing home or other
residential facility. .. (4) if the petition alleges that the person is in need of
major medical or dental treatment and the [AIP] does not consent; (5) the
petition requests temporary powers...; (6) the court determines that a pos-
sible conflict may exist between the court evaluator's role and the advocacy
needs of the [AIP]; (7) if at any time the court determines that appointment
of counsel would be helpful to the resolution of the matter.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
108. See Leinheardt, supra note 4, at 23.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
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In contrast, other elder law attorneys feel that limiting the
mandatory appointment of counsel to situations where the AIP
wishes to contest the proceeding or requests counsel will dilute
the protection afforded the AIP under Article 81.112 These attor-
neys believe that Article 81 purposefully created the separate
roles of court evaluator, to conduct an objective investigation of
the case,113 and counsel, to advocate on the AIP's behalf' 1 4
Since the appointment of a guardian is a serious intervention in
a person's life, often resulting in involuntary medical proce-
dures, hospitalization, or placement in a nursing home, counsel
should be available to the AIP.115 The Law Revision Commis-
sion Comments stress the importance of counsel by delineating
the role to "'include conducting personal interviews with the
person; explaining to the person his or her rights and counsel-
ing the person regarding the nature and consequences of the
proceeding; securing and presenting evidence and testimony;
providing vigorous cross-examination; and offering arguments
to protect the rights of the [AIP]."116
However, recent decisions indicate the feeling among
judges and attorneys that counsel could provide the same serv-
ices as would a court evaluator; therefore, the appointment of
both is unnecessary.11 7 Additionally, the appointment of both a
court evaluator and counsel may potentially exhaust an AIP's
relatively limited assets." 8 Under section 81.10(g), if the court
112. See Bailly II, supra note 34, at 275.
113. See id. at 274; See also Neil B. Posner, Comment, The End of Parens
Patrie in New York: Guardianship Under the New Mental Hygiene Law Article 81
79 MARQ. L. REV. 603, 624 (1996) (noting that "[b]y distinguishing between the
roles [of court evaluator and counsel], Article 81 permits the court to choose an
evaluator whose sphere of expertise is closely aligned with the functional limita-
tions likely to be considered in the proceedings.").
114. See Bailly II, supra note 34, at 274; See also L.R.C. COMM., supra note
39, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
115. See Bailly II, supra note 34, at 274.
116. Id. at 274 (citing L.R.C. COMM., supra note 39, in notes following N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
117. See, e.g., In re Rochester General Hosp., 158 Misc. 2d 522, 525, 601
N.Y.S.2d 375, 378. (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1993); In re Heumann, N.Y.L.J., Nov.
17, 1993, at 29 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993); In re Sulzberger, 159 Misc. 2d 236,
603 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993). See also Leinheardt, supra note 4,
at 23.
118. See In re Rochester General Hosp., 158 Misc. 2d 522, 525, 601 N.Y.S.2d
375, 378 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1993).
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appoints counsel, the court may dispense with the appointment
of a court evaluator. 119 According to the Law Revision Conmis-
sion Comments, the rationale is that counsel's advocacy role
will provide protection for the AiP, and that some estates may
be financially overburdened by the expenses of both court evalu-
ator and counsel. 120 Thus, the objective "best interests" assess-
ment of the AiP, rather than the adversarial approach, may
better serve the AIP's needs. 12'
There are numerous cases where courts have dispensed
with a court evaluator when counsel is appointed. 22 For exam-
ple, in In re Heumann,12 the AIP's son sought the appointment
of a guardian for his father for the sole purpose of moving him
to a health care facility in Israel where the son resided. The
court-appointed counsel for the AiP and dispensed with the ap-
pointment of a court evaluator. 24 Since counsel merely had to
prove that the AIP's needs were being met at his present resi-
dence, and that he adamantly objected to living in Israel, an
attorney, rather than a court evaluator, would best represent
the AIP's interests.125
Similarly, in In re Sulzberger,26 the daughter of an AiP,
who resided in France, sought an order appointing her as
guardian to handle her father's substantial property holdings in
New York. 127 The court determined that counsel could best
119. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(g) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
120. See L.R.C. COMM., supra note 39, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 81.10 (McKinney Supp. 1993). See also Posner, supra note 113, at 626-27
(arguing that although this is not a perfect solution, it is the only appropriate out-
come, in that under the circumstances the legislature has chosen protection of the
respondent's [AIP's] interests over the court's need for a neutral evaluating party).
121. See L.R.C. COMM., supra note 39, in notes following N.Y. MENTAL HYG.
LAW § 81.10 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
122. See, e.g., In re Heumann, N.Y.L.J. Nov. 17, 1993, at 29 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1993); In re Sulzberger, 159 Misc. 2d 236, 603 N.Y.S.2d 656, (Sup. Ct. New
York County 1993). Compare In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 640 N.Y.S.2d
73 (1st Dep't 1996), affd, 89 N.Y.2d 889, 1996 WL 730469 (1996) (noting that
whether to dispense with the appointment of court evaluator is a matter entrusted
to the discretion of the court, especially in cases where the guardian will have
power to either place the AIP in a nursing home or to make major medical
decisions).
123. N.Y.L.J. Nov. 17, 1993, at 29 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. 159 Misc. 2d 236, 603 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1993).
127. See id. at 237, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 657-58.
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serve the needs of the AiP, since the issues to be investigated
were predominantly legal questions. 128 The court also con-
cluded that the appointment of a court evaluator to travel to
France would be an unnecessary expense, probably in excess of
$10,000, to be borne by the AIP.129 The court avoided overbur-
dening the estate of the AIP by appointing counsel for the AIP
and dispensing with the appointment of a court evaluator. 130
D. Compensation for Court Evaluator and Counsel
The other controversy underlying the necessity of both a
court evaluator and counsel in guardianship proceedings is the
compensation awarded. A court-appointed attorney is paid on a
quantum meruit' 3' basis, while the court evaluator and counsel
for petitioner are paid according to a percentage, instructed by
rule of the Appellate Division.13 2
1. Compensation for Court Evaluator
Under section 81.09(f), the court may award a reasonable
allowance to a court evaluator, including the Mental Hygiene
Legal Service. 3 3 When a judge grants a petition, the sum is
payable by the AIP's estate. 34 When a judge denies or dis-
128. See id. at 241, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
129. See id. at 241, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
130. See id. at 241, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
131. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, supra note 3.
Quantum meruit:
measures recovery under implied contract to pay compensation as reason-
able value of services rendered. An equitable doctrine, based on the concept
that no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be
unjustly enriched thereby; under those circumstances, the law implies a
promise to pay a reasonable amount for the labor and materials furnished,
even absent a specific contract therefor.
BLAcKi's LAW DicTioNARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990).
132. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.28 (McKinney Supp. 1993); Interview
with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3. The percentage calculation is 2% of the
first $125,000 of the AIP's estate; then 1% of the next $75,000 of the AIP's estate;
amounts over $200,000 are calculated to be .05% of the AIP's estate. See id. One-
third of this total is allocated to the court evaluator and two-thirds are allocated to
the petitioner's attorney. See id.
133. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.09(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993). The bill
presented by the Senate on May 23, 1996 proposes to substitute the word "compen-
sation" for the word "allowance" in § 81.09(f). See 1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess.
§ 10(f) (1996).
134. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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misses the petition, the sum is payable by the petitioner, by the
AIP or both as the court may deem just.1385
For example, in In re Presbyterian Hospital,13 6 the hospital
commenced a proceeding for the appointment of a guardian for
the AIP, alleging that she should be placed in a residential
health care facility due to her psychological and physical inca-
pacities. 137 The AiP, a blind, diabetic and frail eighty-year-old,
resided alone until a fall resulted in hospitalization. 138 The AIP
contested the proceeding, strongly objecting to placement in a
nursing home.139 The court found that she understood her func-
tional limitations, and therefore had arranged for a certain level
of home care to be provided by her friends, including preparing
meals, shopping, laundry and managing her finances. 140 The
135. See id.
136. N.Y.L.J. July 2, 1993, at 1A (Sup. Ct. New York County 1993).
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. See, e.g., In re Crump, 646 N.Y.S.2d 825 (2d Dep't 1996) (revers-
ing appointment of guardian where AIP's plan for management of affairs and pos-
session of sufficient resources to protect her well-being obviated need for
guardian); In re O'Hear, 219 A.D.2d 720, 631 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1995) (holding
that notwithstanding any incapacity of the AiP, the appointment of a guardian
was unnecessary in light of plan made while she had capacity for management of
her affairs, which included granting an unlimited power of attorney to adult son,
will, living will and health care proxy; further, there was no showing that the AIP's
son engaged in any impropriety with respect to care of AIP or her assets); In re
Maher, 207 A.D.2d 133, 612 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding that despite the
AIP's functional limitations resulting from a stroke, evidence that the AIP appreci-
ated the extent of his handicaps to the extent that he effectuated a plan for assist-
ance in managing his financial affairs made the appointment of a guardian
unnecessary). See also In re Janczak, 167 Misc. 2d 766, 634 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup.
Ct. Ontario County 1995) (appointing county commissioner of social services as
special guardian for an AiP, despite the willingness and availability of the AIP's
son and daughter-in-law to assist her, due to the fact that in the past these rela-
tives had been unable to maintain proper hygiene and had not sought prompt med-
ical attention for the AlP when required); In re Rimler, 164 Misc. 2d 403, 625
N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995) (holding that the appointment of a
guardian was necessary for an obese patient with borderline personality disorder
who was unable to manage her property, had not shown a desire to have people
assist her with her personal needs and property management, and lacked under-
standing and appreciation of the nature and consequences of her functional limita-
tions); In re Kustka, 163 Misc. 2d 694, 622 N.Y.S.2d 208 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1994) (holding that appointment of independent guardian for the AIP was appro-
priate in view of evidence of AIP's new wife's questionable financial transactions
with AIP's assets and evidence that AIP seemed confused regarding his financial
affairs). Compare In re Lichtenstein, 223 A.D.2d 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dep't
466
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petitioner failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence
that the AIP was incapable of providing for herself both person-
ally and financially; therefore, the court dismissed the peti-
tion.141 Pursuant to section 81.09(f),142 the court ordered the
petitioner to pay the court evaluator compensation for his
service. 143
Some elder law attorneys feel that imposing the court
evaluator's compensation on the petitioner, when the petition is
dismissed, will prevent people from rendering assistance to
those who are impaired.144 Perhaps requiring a "bad faith or
willful" standard before imposing costs on the petitioner will
prevent concerned individuals from the fear of instituting such
a proceeding. 45 However, some commentators have said that
the current scheme does not discourage petitioners. 146 They feel
that hospitals, nursing homes, the Department of Social Service
1996) (holding the appointment of a guardian without the AIP's consent was error
absent specific findings on the record as to functional limitations, need for guard-
ian to prevent harm, specific powers of guardian and duration of appointment); In
re Onondaga County Dep't of Social Services, 162 Misc. 2d 733, 619 N.Y.S.2d 238
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1994) (dismissing petition seeking designation of
guardian where petition did not set forth any meaningful facts pertaining to per-
son's functional level, made no reference to any medical test results or specific
evaluations, and provided no specific factual allegations as to personal actions or
financial transactions illustrating that AIP was likely to suffer harm because of
inability to adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
his actions).
141. See In re Presbyterian Hosp., N.Y.L.J. July 2, 1993, at 1A. Compare In re
Nhan Thi Thanh Le, 168 Misc. 2d 384, 637 N.Y.S.2d 614 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1995) (appointing co-guardians where there was clear and convincing evidence
that AIP (a ten-year-old child) was likely to suffer harm because he was unable to
provide for management of proposed settlement of his personal injury claim and
could not adequately understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of
that inability).
142. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.09(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
143. See In re Presbyterian Hosp., N.Y.L.J. July 2, 1993, at 1A.; See also In re
Crump, 646 N.Y.S.2d 825 (2d Dep't 1996) (ordering petitioner to pay any compen-
sation awarded guardian, petitioner's own legal fees, court evaluator fee, and fee of
petitioner's expert, in case where appointment of guardian was reversed).
144. See Leinheardt, supra note 4, at 25.
145. See id.; Cf In re Arnold "0", 640 N.Y.S.2d 355 (3d Dep't 1996) (uphold-
ing the imposition of an award of counsel fees for frivolous conduct where petition-
ers not only engaged in a course of conduct designed to interfere with a guardian's
performance of his duties, but also attempted to remove said guardian based only
upon conclusory allegations of misconduct, while the record was replete with evi-
dence that the guardian had fulfilled his responsibilities).
146. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
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and individuals take these proceedings very seriously and do
not initiate them merely to injure an AiP.147 Furthermore, the
dismissal of a petition is a very rare occurrence. 148
2. Compensation for Court-Appointed Attorney
Under section 81.10(f), the court shall determine the rea-
sonable compensation for the Mental Hygiene Legal Service or
any appointed attorney.149 The AIP must pay for such compen-
sation, unless the AIP is indigent.150 If the petition is dis-
missed, the court has the discretion to direct the petitioner to
pay such compensation for the AIP.1ti
In In re Rocco,152 on the day scheduled for the commence-
ment of a jury trial for this guardianship appointment, the
court granted the petitioner's application to withdraw the peti-
tion.153 The parties agreed that the petitioner should pay the
reasonable allowance due the court evaluator. 154 However, the
AIP contended that section 81.10(f) also authorized the court to
direct the petitioner to pay the AIP's attorney's fees.155 The
court determined that the plain language of section 81.10(f) in-
dicates that the only fees recoverable by the AIP's attorney are
those for the Mental Hygiene Legal Service or a court-appointed
attorney. 156 Thus, the court found that section 81.10(f) does not
allow the recovery of fees when the AIP retains his or her own
attorney.157
The court noted that it would be more equitable to the AIP,
if upon the dismissal of a petition, Article 81 included the au-
thority for the court to direct payment of legal fees of the AlP
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. 161 Misc. 2d 760, 615 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1994).
153. See id. at 761, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 261. Despite the fact that the AIP had a
dysfunctional family, the court found that she was entirely capable of handling her
activities of daily living and financial affairs, and therefore did not require the
"extreme measure" of appointing a guardian. Id. at 766, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
154. See id. at 761, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 762, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
157. See id. at 763, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 262. See also N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW
§ 81.10(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
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whether counsel is appointed or privately retained.158 The court
reasoned that the current scheme might discourage AiPs from
retaining an attorney, when such person already faces other ex-
penses during the proceeding. 16 9 The court lamented:
[i]n a statutory scheme which is so greatly focused on recognizing
and protecting the rights of an alleged incapacitated person, the
practical limitation on such a person's present access to counsel is
incongruous. The statute should encourage an alleged incapaci-
tated person, irrespective of such person's financial status, who
may be inclined to resist a petition. . . to assert all legal rights,
and this ordinarily can only be done with the assistance of
counsel. 160
The court respectfully urged the New York Legislature to
amend Article 81 to address this issue. 161
3. Compensation for Petitioner's Attorney
Under section 81.16(f), when a petition is granted, or where
the court otherwise deems it appropriate, the court may award
reasonable compensation for the petitioner's attorney, including
the attorney general for a local department of social services. 162
In In re Chachkers,163 the court determined that an Article
81 proceeding may be discontinued prior to an evidentiary hear-
ing if it is in the best interest of the MiP.'" In Chachkers, the
petitioner, the Director of Social Services of New York Univer-
sity Medical Center, sought the appointment of a guardian for
the AIP. 165 The bed-bound seventy-seven year old AIP was re-
covering from a stroke, had to be fed through a. nasal-gastric
tube, and was disoriented from dementia and clinical depres-
sion.166 By the return date of the order to show cause, the court
evaluator's report of the AIP revealed that she had recovered
significantly both physically and mentally. 67
158. See Rocco, 161 Misc. 2d at 763, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 262.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.16(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
163. 159 Misc. 2d 912, 606 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993).
164. See id. at 914, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
165. See id. at 913, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
166. See id.
167. See id.
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Because of the AIP's recovery, petitioner's counsel wished
to withdraw the proceeding; both the court evaluator and re-
tained counsel for the AIP also desired a discontinuance. 168 The
court determined that a discontinuance was appropriate, even
without a hearing, since all parties agreed that a guardian was
not necessary. 169 Since the petitioner acted in good faith in
bringing the proceeding, the AIP had to pay for the court evalu-
ator's services. 70 However, the court declined to impose peti-
tioner's counsel fees on the AIP, since there was no special
circumstance to warrant fee shifting in this discontinued
proceeding.' 7 '
E. The Problem of Excessive Legal Fees
Article 81 delineates how the court evaluator, counsel, and
guardian are to be compensated. 72 Additionally, the statute
gives the court the discretion to reduce legal fees it deems exces-
sive. 173  The percentage system of compensation is not
mandatory. Thus, if the AIP has a large estate and the case
requires little work, the court has the discretion to recommend
payment of the court evaluator and counsel at an hourly rate
rather than in a lump sum.174
Excessive legal fees seem to result from the participating
attorneys' ignorance that the court ultimately has the discretion
to determine "reasonable compensation." 75 For example, in In
168. See id.
169. See Chackers, 159 Misc. 2d at 914, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
170. See id. at 916, 606 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
171. See id.
172. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.09(f), 81.10(f) and 81.28 (McKinney
Supp. 1993).
173. See id. These sections give the court the discretion to determine "reason-
able compensation" for the roles of court evaluator, counsel and guardian. See In
re Franczoz, No. 24410-1-94 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1994), reprinted in AD.
VANCED ISSUES IN GUARDIANSHIP 70 (New York State Bar Ass'n 1995). See also In
re Lichtenstein, 223 A.D.2d 309, 646 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1st Dep't 1996) (reversing and
remanding for reconsideration of an award of attorney's fees to petitioner's counsel
due to the absence of a basis in the record for said award); In re Whitehead, 642
N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1996) (holding that Article 81 of the Mental
Hygiene Law requires that the determination of reasonable fees be awarded under
New York law, notwithstanding previous fee determination by a Canadian court).
174. See Interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
175. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § § 81.09(f), 81.10(f) and 81.28 (McKinney
Supp. 1993).
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re Roy,176 following the appointment of guardians for the AIP,
the court addressed the issue of the fee awarded to the peti-
tioner's attorney.177 Even though the petitioner had signed a
retainer agreement, setting the rate of payment at $250.00 per
hour, which would have resulted in a total fee of $11,186, the
court awarded the petitioner's attorney $5,500.178 Since the AIP
must pay the petitioner's attorney's fees when a petition is
granted, the court concluded that the terms of a retainer agree-
ment between a petitioner and counsel in an Article 81 proceed-
ing are not necessarily determinative of "reasonable
compensation" within the meaning of section 81.16(f). 179
In fact, the court stated that if an attorney persuades a cli-
ent to sign a retainer agreement with an assurance that the
proceeding will ultimately result in no expense to the petitioner,
such attorney has either negligently or deliberately made a ma-
terial misrepresentation to the client. °80 Therefore, the court
suggested that when consulted by a client anticipating an Arti-
cle 81 proceeding, an attorney should clearly state that
whatever fee arrangement is agreed upon is subject to the
court's determination as to what constitutes "reasonable
compensation."' 8 '
Sometimes attorneys take advantage of a wealthy AiP, in
which case, the court's ability under Article 81 to intervene and
reduce legal fees is a great protection for AiPs. For example, in
In re Spingarn,8 2 the court found many of the 230 hours billed
by a large firm of attorneys to a ninety-five year old wealthy
woman during an Article 81 proceeding to be unnecessary, du-
plicative, and not the responsibility of the AIP. 183 Accordingly,
the court reduced such fees.'8 4
The court noted, for example, that when two or more part-
ners conversed or sent internal memos to each other, they all
billed for their time, even though this was a relatively simple
176. 164 Misc. 2d 146, 623 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1995).
177. See id. at 151, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 148-49, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98.
180. See id. at 149, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
181. See id. at 149-50, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 998.
182. 164 Misc. 2d 891, 626 N.Y.S.2d 650 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
183. See id. at 898, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
184. See id.
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proceeding.18 5 The guardian in the proceeding pointed out that
attorneys involved in guardianship proceedings had been at-
tending Bar Association programs to acquire expertise without
billing the clients for "study time," yet the attorneys in this case
billed for their research time.' 86 The court noted that a client
who retains an attorney has the right to expect that the attor-
ney has the required expertise; acquiring such knowledge
should not be at the client's expense without prior agreement. 8 7
Finally, a court might simply determine that a fee should
be reduced due to the nature of the proceeding, the expertise
required or the amount of work that was completed. 88 For ex-
ample, in In re Franczoz,189 although the AIP's assets were esti-
mated at over ten million dollars and the court was satisfied
with the submitted hourly billable rates of counsel, the court
evaluator obtained a consensus from counsel that they would
accept eighty-three percent of their requested legal fees. 190
The court noted that the compensation sought was to be
paid by an individual who had "no independent voice in the
legal entanglements of which he became the primary sub-
ject."' 91 Therefore, the court concluded that fees should be de-
termined in sums which are less than typically commanded in
the private legal sector. 92
F. Who Pays When the AIP Is Indigent?
Section 81.10(f) states that the AIP shall be liable for com-
pensation for the Mental Hygiene Legal Service or any court-
appointed attorney unless the court is satisfied that the person
is indigent. 193 However, Article 81 fails to make any provision
for the situation where the AIP is indigent. 94 In In re St.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 896, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
187. See id.
188. No. 24410-1-94 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1994), reprinted in ADVANCED
ISSUES IN GUARDIANSHIP 70 (New York State Bar Ass'n 1995).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 71.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 72.
193. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10(0 (McKinney Supp. 1993).
194. See generally id., § 81.
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Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center,195 the petitioner sought the
appointment of a guardian for an elderly indigent woman who
was a patient at the hospital.19 The petitioner's request for the
appointment of a temporary guardian, for the transfer of the
MIP to a nursing home, and for the appointment of a guardian
to make major medical decisions without the AIP's consent, re-
quired the appointment of counsel under section 81.10.197
The court found that when an Article 81 petition requests
that a guardian be given power to either place the AIP in a
nursing home or other institutional facility, or to make major
medical decisions, an indigent AIP is constitutionally entitled to
the appointment of counsel at the state's expense. 198 The court
concluded that the cost of the appointed counsel in a guardian-
ship proceeding should be borne by New York City pursuant to
Articles 18-A and B of the County Law. 199 Under Articles 18-A
and B, "a judge may assign counsel to represent any adult in a
proceeding under this act if he determines that such assign-
ment of counsel is mandated by the constitution of the State of
New York or of the United States, and includes such determina-
tion in the order assigning counsel."200
The court addressed an additional conflict of interest prob-
lem that arises during the appointment of both a court evalu-
ator and counsel.20' The court praised Article 81's recognition of
the AIP's right to counsel due to the risk that the court evalu-
ator may make recommendations at odds with the wishes of the
AIP.2 2 The court noted that just as the statute is silent about
compensation for counsel to indigents, the statute is also silent
as to compensation for court evaluators where the petition is
dismissed, or where the AIP's estate is inadequate. 20 3 Thus, the
court determined that since, "in a case like this, where both a
195. 159 Misc. 2d 932, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993), aft'd,
640 N.Y.S.2d 73 (1st Dep't. 1996), aft'd, 89 N.Y.2d 889, 1996 WL 730469 (1996).
196. See id. at 933, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
197. See id. at 933-34, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
198. See id. at 939-40, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
199. See id. at 945, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 583; See also N.Y. CoUNTY LAW §§ 18-A &
18-B (McKinney 1991).
200. St. Luke's, 159 Misc. 2d at 941, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 580 (quoting FAM. CT.
ACT. § 262 (b)(McKinney 1991); SURR. CT. PROC. ACT, § 407 (McKinney 1991)).
201. See id. at 943, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
202. See id. at 942, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
203. See id. at 942, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 581-82.
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[court evaluator] and counsel are required, if the [Mental Hy-
giene Legal Service] constitutes the only source from which a
[court evaluator], can be drawn, because of conflict problems it
cannot not also be a resource from which counsel may be ap-
pointed."2 4 In other words, independent counsel would have to
be appointed to represent the interests of the AiP.
Historically, funds have not been available to allow the
Mental Hygiene Legal Service to be appointed for everyone in
need.20 5 Therefore, the resources of the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service have been limited to those who are institutionalized. 20 6
The court noted that the Mental Hygiene Legal Service was not
authorized to serve as a court evaluator or counsel unless the
AIP is already institutionalized. 20 7 Thus, there is no source of
payment for the appointment of either a court evaluator or
counsel in cases where the AIP resides in the community. 208 In
the instant case, since the AIP was a patient in the hospital, the
court appointed the Mental Hygiene Legal Service as the court
evaluator pursuant to section 81.09(b)(2) 20 9 and a solo practi-
tioner from the 18-B panel as counsel for the AIP.210
On appeal, the court found it was error to adjudge that the
city was the entity responsible for the payment of Article 81 as-
signed counsel without notice or fact-finding. 21' The city did not
contest that the indigent AIP had the right to assigned counsel
by reason of a constitutional mandate.212 However, since the
city was denied notice and an opportunity to submit factual ar-
guments on the availability of alternatives to representation of
the AIP by County Law 18-B panelists, the court remanded the
case for reconsideration of this issue. 213
On April 2, 1996, the Appellate Division affirmed the
Supreme Court, New York County's decision which had directed
204. Id. at 943, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
205. See interview with Frances M. Pantaleo, Esq., supra note 58.
206. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.10(e) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
207. See St. Luke's, 159 Misc. 2d at 943, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 945, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
211. See In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 627 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1st Dep't.
1995).
212. See id.
213. See id. at 357-58.
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the City of New York to pay the fees of attorneys appointed to
represent indigent AIPs
in every case in the City of New York where, (i) a petition pursu-
ant to Article 81 of the Mental Hygiene Law seeks appointment of
a guardian with power either to place an AIP in a nursing home
or to make major medical decisions for the AIP and, (ii) the
Mental Hygiene Legal Service is not appointed to serve as
counsel. 214
The court explained that "[g]iven legislative silence on the mat-
ter, [the] [s]upreme [clourt appropriately directed that the ex-
pense should be borne by the City which, as between the City
and the State, is the more appropriate source of public funding
for the appointment of counsel in constitutionally mandated
cases.1215
Justice Kupferman dissented, arguing that the majority
could have avoided the funding problem entirely by dispensing
with the appointment of court evaluator under section 81.10(g),
and appointing the Mental Hygiene Legal Service as counsel for
the AIP.216 The majority noted that "whether to dispense with
the appointment of a court evaluator is a matter entrusted to
the sound discretion of the court," apparently believing that the
AIP's interests in this case must be represented independently
from the court evaluator by counsel.217 On December 20, 1996,
the New York Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.218 The
214. In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital, 640 N.Y.S.2d 73, 74 (1st Dep't. 1996).
215. Id. (citing Deason v. Deason, 32 N.Y.2d 93, 95, 296 N.E.2d 229, 343
N.Y.S.2d 321 (1973)).
216. See id. at 74 (Kupferman, J., dissenting). He argued, "[w]ith the Mental
Hygiene Legal Service as her counsel, respondent [the AIP] would be well pro-
tected while the taxpayers would have one less funding obligation." Id. at 75.
217. Id. at 73.
218. See In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital, 89 N.Y.2d 889, 1996 WL 730469
(1996). The court explained,
[a]lthough the statutes are silent on who should pay counsel in Mental Hy-
giene Article 81 proceedings, the responsibility of paying for assigned coun-
sel in the overwhelming majority of cases in which the appointment of
counsel for indigents has been authorized has fallen upon the locality under
Article 18-b, rather than the state pursuant to Judiciary Law § 35. The evi-
dence in the record before us establishes that Article 18-b panels are better
able, both financially and practically, to provide the needed assistance
under this provision of the Mental Hygiene Law. Accordingly, in the ab-
sence of legislation directing otherwise, we affirm the determination of the
courts below that assignment of counsel here is appropriately funded by the
19971 475
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court specifically noted that the supreme court did not abuse its
discretion in failing to simply remove the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service as court evaluator and appointing that entity to repre-
sent the AIP.219
Other New York courts have found an informal way to ad-
dress the problem of lack of funding for the representation of
indigent AiPs, because the alternative of no representation at
all would be unjust.220 In the Ninth Judicial District, 221 if the
AiP is indigent, in most cases neither the court evaluator nor
counsel are compensated. 222 Nine out of ten times, if an attor-
ney from the list of approved fiduciaries is asked to represent an
indigent AiP, the attorney will agree to the representation,
knowing he or she will not be compensated. 223 Such representa-
tion is not forgotten when a recommendation for counsel is re-
quired to handle a wealthy estate; the attorney who represented
an AiP pro bono will be asked first.224
On the other hand, if a petition is brought by the Depart-
ment of Social Services, as is often the case, the petitioner is
paid by the County.225 The County pays the petitioner and any
court-appointed attorney, even if the County does not meet its
burden of proof or if the case is dismissed.226 Thus, it is not
always true that attorneys are not compensated when the AiP
is indigent. 227 Rather, only the court evaluator is left uncom-
pensated. 228 The net effect of the inequitable scheme of compen-
sation for petitioner, court evaluator and counsel for the
indigent AiP is that concerned individuals may be less inclined
to bring these proceedings. 229
City of New York in accordance with the procedures set forth in County Law
Article 18-b.
Id. at 1.
219. See id. at 2, n.*.
220. See Interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
221. The Ninth Judicial District consists of the counties of Westchester, Put-
nam, Dutchess, Rockland and Orange.
222. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Telephone Interview with Denise P. Ward, Esq., Elder Law Attorney,
Rye, N.Y. (Aug. 7, 1996).
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
[Vol. 17:445476
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss2/5
GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS
Another problem associated with the payment of legal fees
arises when an AIP is not indigent, yet does not want to pay for
legal services.230 This occurs when the court evaluator asks the
AIP if he or she would like an attorney to represent him or
her.23 ' Often the AIP wants to contest the petition, but does not
understand the role an attorney might play.232 Furthermore,
even though the AIP could afford legal fees, he or she does not
want to pay for such representation.233 The problem is com-
pounded by the lack of financial disclosure of the AiP.23 4 The
court evaluator only has access to information made available
by the AIP, and therefore must rely on what is stated in the
petition with regard to the AIP's assets.23 5 Considering the rep-
utation of some attorneys for excessive legal fees, the AIP's
fears are not ungrounded. However, this problem exists, and
the potential for an AIP to be denied representation is great if
there is no way for the court to determine whether an AIP can
afford counsel or if counsel needs to be appointed by the court.
In conclusion, the statute needs to be amended to address
the compensation of attorneys in cases where the AIP is indi-
gent. The practice among judges of asking attorneys to repre-
sent AiPs on a pro bono basis and subsequently appointing the
same attorney to a case in which the judge knows there will be a
substantial fee is quite common.23 6 The judges, law clerks and
attorneys involved are uncomfortable with this informal "make-
shift" arrangement. 3 7 Article 81 affords some relief, in that the
court can dispense with the appointment of a court evaluator if
counsel is appointed; and the court can appoint professionals
whose fees may not be as high as those of an attorney, such as a
social worker.238
The Committee on Pro Bono Services for the Elderly pub-
lished an article in Elder Law Attorney encouraging attorneys
230. See id.
231. See Telephone Interview with Denise P. Ward, Esq., supra note 225.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See Bailly II, supra note 34, at 277.
237. See id.
238. See id.
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to volunteer for pro bono services. 239 The article advocated as-
sisting elderly clients with their financial, family and health
care problems, because "the poor elderly are entitled to legal
assistance comparable to their contemporaries of more substan-
tial means despite their inability to pay legal fees."24° The arti-
cle listed resources throughout New York for attorneys to
become involved in pro bono projects. 241 Attorneys need to keep
in mind that Article 81 proceedings require counsel who are
qualified to act in the capacity of court evaluator or attorney for
the AIP.242 There are many continuing legal education pro-
grams available for attorneys who are not versed in Article 81
proceedings, yet have an interest in Elderlaw issues.
G. Practitioner's Proposals to Decrease the Cost of
Guardianship Proceedings
Since many involved (judges, practitioners, and the AiP)
are concerned about the great expense involved in these pro-
ceedings, the finding and implementation of ways to decrease
costs would be beneficial. Under section 81.11(a), "a determina-
tion that the appointment of a guardian is necessary for a per-
son alleged to be incapacitated shall be made only after a
hearing."243 Members of the legal profession have suggested
that the requirement of a full hearing be eliminated in cases
where the AIP is in a coma or is otherwise unable to communi-
cate.2 44 These lawyers have also advocated the elimination of a
full hearing when there is no substantial dispute regarding the
AIP's functional limitations.2 5 They believe that these minor
239. Do the Public Good Volunteer for Pro Bono, ELDER LAW AT'ry Vol. 3, No.
2 (Fall/Winter 1993) at 32, N.Y.S.B.A.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 33.
242. See Telephone Interview with Denise P. Ward, Esq., supra note 225.
243. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.11(a) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
244. As reported during an Interview with Frances M. Pantaleo, Esq., supra
note 58.
245. See id. Under § 81.36(c),
[there shall be a hearing on notice to the persons entitled to notice .... If
any party to the proceeding raises an issue of fact as to the ability of the
[AiP] to provide for his or her personal needs or property management and
demands a jury trial of such issue, the court shall order a trial by jury
thereof.
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changes will not affect the procedural safeguards of the statute
and that considerable resources will be saved as a result.246
III. Analysis
A. Finding Resources to Serve as Court Evaluator, Counsel
and Guardian
The most difficult task in guardianship proceedings is find-
ing resources to act as either court evaluator or court-appointed
counsel. 247 The incentive to participate in these proceedings is
lacking somewhat, due to the inability of many elderly to com-
pensate these individuals. An effort to encourage attorneys to
serve in these roles should be made to ensure that the elderly
receive adequate representation. The current scheme of re-
questing an attorney to represent AIPs on a pro bono basis with
the intent of awarding him or her a fee in the subsequent repre-
sentation of a wealthier AIP is inadequate. 24 Article 81 should
be amended to implement alternative methods of compensation
for these attorneys.
There are several possibilities that might solve the problem
of compensation for counsel representing indigent AIPs. The
first involves having attorneys participate without any compen-
sation. Legislation requiring minimum pro bono hours for at-
torneys is an option; however, there are drawbacks to this
solution.249 Mandatory pro bono might not be even-handedly
N.Y. MENrAL HYG. LAW § 81.36(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993). The bill introduced by
the Senate of May 23, 1996 proposes the following amendment to this section:
[tihere shall be a hearing on notice to the persons entitled to notice .... The
court may for good cause shown, dispense with the hearing, provided that
the order of discharge or modification shall set forth the factual basis for
dispensing with the hearing. If the [AIP] or his or her counsel raises an
issue of fact as to the ability of the [AIP] to provide for his or her personal
needs or property management and demands a jury trial of such issue, the
court shall order a trial by jury thereof.
1995 N.Y. S.B. 7601, Reg. Sess. § 26 (1996).
246. As reported during an Interview with Frances M. Pantaleo, Esq., supra
note 58.
247. See interview with Charles F. Devlin, Esq., supra note 3.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 220-24.
249. See, e.g. Cynthia R. Watkins, Note, In Support of Mandatory Pro Bono
Rule for New York State, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 177 (1991). While this author advo-
cates mandatory pro bono for New York state, she raises some provocative argu-
ments against its implementation. Id. at 196-97. The following are several which
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applied, in that it may affect some attorneys more than others.
For example, one attorney might represent an AIP in a proceed-
ing that is resolved expeditiously, while another attorney may
become involved in a case that lasts for several years.
An additional problem with mandatory pro bono is that
large law firms can allocate the pro bono hours to an associate,
while a solo practitioner might have to struggle to find time to
meet the minimum hours requirement. Furthermore, with
mandatory pro bono hours, there is no guarantee that attorneys
would choose to participate in guardianship proceedings. Thus,
the resource problem might not even be addressed.
On the other hand, mandatory pro bono hours would cer-
tainly address the problem, even if only at a minimum.
Although there is no guarantee that attorneys with a pro bono
requirement would choose to represent indigent AiPs, it is
likely that some will. Perhaps if continuing education were also
required for attorneys, familiarity with Article 81 would provide
an incentive to participate in guardianship proceedings. One
commentator notes that providing "continuing education 'certif-
icates' or 'vouchers' in return for pro bono hours would be an
incentive to increase pro bono contributions."250 Thus, perhaps
the requirement or provision of continuing education, combined
she discusses: (1) "doubts about the effectiveness of any representation where the
attorney has been forced to accept the case," (2) the rule will have a "chilling effect"
on voluntarism and contributions to legal aid programs, (3) the rule will "relieve
government of its obligation to provide legal services for the poor." Id. at 198-99
(citing arguments rejected by the Marrero Commitee, the entity charged with ex-
amining the availibility of legal services and to make recommendations for im-
provements). Id. at 178. Furthermore, this author discusses the general
sentiment that "the best solution to meeting the legal needs of the poor is in-
creased funding for legal services programs." Id. at 181-82 (citing comments of the
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, Final Report to the Chief
Judge of the State of New York (Apr. 1990)). The theory is that
[tihe legal problems of the poor are best handled by professionals exper-
ienced in the field and available full-time to handle cases that may require
protracted appearances in court and which may last for years .... More
funding would increase the availability of legal services by making it possi-
ble to provide more full-time attorneys with expertise in poverty law and
poverty issues. Increased funding would provide resources to increase sal-
ary levels, or to provide other financial incentives to attract attorneys to
legal services offices.
Id. at 182.
250. See Watkins, supra note 249, at 194. To provide incentives, this author
also advocates encouraging law firms "to count pro bono work, or a portion thereof,
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with mandatory pro bono, might help to provide additional re-
sources to represent indigent AiPs.
There are other alternatives to mandatory pro bono hours
that might better address the lack of resource problem. Con-
cerned individuals could lobby for incentives, such as an income
tax break for attorneys who represent AiPs on a pro bono basis.
Currently, "unreimbursed litigation expenses made incident to
the rendition of services" to a qualified tax-exempt organization
are fully deductible.251 For example, expenses for the telephone,
stamps, supplies and filing fees made in the course of represent-
ing an AIP for Westchester Putnam Legal Services would be de-
ductible as a charitable contribution for income tax purposes.252
Similarly, out-of-pocket transportation expenses necessarily in-
curred in performing donated services are deductible. 253
Although these deductions should create an incentive to
represent AiPs on a pro bono basis, perhaps the Legislature
might consider an even greater inducement for such representa-
tion. For example, the Internal Revenue Service could allow at-
torneys to exclude other sources of income from their tax
return, to offset the income which they are not receiving during
pro bono representation.
Another way to attract attorneys to act as court evaluator,
counsel or guardian in guardianship proceedings might be to
make attorneys more aware of the existing lack of resource
problem. Perhaps if attorneys had knowledge of the need for
their assistance, more would offer their services. The New York
State Bar Association should sponsor regular advertisements in
journals, similar to the one published in Elder Law Attorney, to
advocate pro bono representation of impoverished AIPs.254
However, the advertisements should be run in a variety of jour-
nals, and not merely ones read by attorneys who regularly rep-
resent elders. In this manner, any interested attorney could
obtain the requisite training with regard to Article 81 proceed-
ings and participate as court evaluator, counsel or guardian.
as 'billable hours,' and to consider pro bono activities in their decisions regarding
promotions, bonuses and partnership." Id.
251. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (1995).
252. See Lee v. Commissioner, 80 T.C.M. 348, 349 (1980).
253. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(g) (1995).
254. See supra text accompanying notes 239-41.
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B. The Necessity of Court Evaluator and Counsel
Since the appointment of both a court evaluator and coun-
sel has the potential to deplete the assets of the AiP, courts
should regularly opt to appoint only one of these profession-
als.25 5 The argument that limiting the mandatory appointment
of counsel to situations where the AIP contests the proceeding
or requests counsel will dilute the protection afforded the AIP
under Article 81 is not well-grounded. 256 Individuals who are
concerned about the AIP's well-being or his or her ability to
manage financially are generally the petitioners in guardian-
ship proceedings. 25 7 Therefore, unless the AIP contests the
guardianship appointment, the proceedings generally should
not be adversarial.
Of course, counsel should be available if the AIP cannot
represent his or her own interests, or is adamantly opposed to
the appointment of a guardian. However, the decision to ap-
point counsel should be discretionary, depending on the circum-
stances of each case. For example, if at the time of the hearing,
the court determines the AiP has problems managing his or her
finances, the court should appoint counsel and dispense with
the appointment of a court evaluator. On the other hand, if the
AIP's problems are generally functional, the court should ap-
point a social worker as court evaluator. The reason is that a
social worker is better equipped to address activities of daily
living issues; furthermore, his or her fees would almost cer-
tainly be substantially less than those required for payment of
counsel. This procedure should effectively reduce the cost of Ar-
ticle 81 proceedings, thereby protecting the AIP from excessive
depletion of his or her finances.
C. The Role of Counsel
Clarification as to the role of counsel in guardianship pro-
ceedings is necessary under Article 81 and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. 258 As a zealous advocate, the role of the
attorney for the AIP seems to be to contest the proceeding, even
255. See supra text accompanying notes 117-30.
256. See supra text accompanying notes 112-16.
257. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
258. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10 (McKINNEY SUPP. 1993); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1981).
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though the AIP clearly needs assistance. 259 To avoid such a det-
rimental effect on the AIP, perhaps counsel for an AIP who is
unable to make responsible decisions on his or her own behalf
should advocate for the least restrictive form of intervention. 26 0
The attorney's duty is thereby met as long as he or she does not
waive any fundamental rights of the client, "such as the right to
a hearing."261
D. Who Should Pay for the Services of Court Evaluator and
Counsel?
There is considerable controversy regarding the method of
compensation for court evaluator and counsel in Article 81 pro-
ceedings.262 When a judge grants a petition, the AIP or the es-
tate of the AIP is responsible for payment of both the court
evaluator and any court-appointed attorney.263 When a judge
denies or dismisses a petition, the court then has the discretion
to allocate payment to either the AIP, the petitioner, or both, as
the court deems just.26
Rather than leave the allocation of payment to the discre-
tion of the court, Article 81 should be amended to require a bad
faith or willful standard for the imposition of costs on the peti-
tioner. 26 5 Leaving the decision to the court's discretion in-
creases the likelihood that petitioners will unfairly have to pay
for these proceedings. 266 For example, if the Department of So-
cial Service, in good faith, files a petition to appoint a guardian
259. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
260. See Pecora, supra note 54, at 167.
261. Id.
262. See supra part II.D.
263. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 81.09(f), 81.10(f) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
264. Id.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 144-48.
266. One commentator notes,
[firom the point of view of the petitioner, however, the climb is steep. Be-
nevolence and good intentions will not suffice, nor will the word of the family
doctor or neurologist. Unless the petitioner can afford good legal counsel,
not only might the petition fail, but the petitioner may be charged for the
cost of the court evaluator and court-appointed counsel. On one hand, this
policy is likely to discourage the filing of petitions prematurely, as well as
some inspired by venal motives. On the other hand, a good faith petitioner
might take an unnecessarily conservative approach and wait as long as pos-
sible, perhaps too long, before filing.
Posner, supra note 113, at 640-41.
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for an AIP with obvious functional problems, yet the petition is
dismissed for procedural reasons, the court may still impose
these costs on the petitioner. If this outcome becomes the rule,
rather than the exception, concerned individuals and institu-
tions will become overly cautious and might fail to act when an
elder is truly in need.26 7 Thus, it would be more equitable to
require proof of either petitioner's intent to cause financial
harm to the AIP or a lack of any evidence on the record as to
functional limitations of the AIP before the court imposes these
costs. This requirement will serve to encourage rather than dis-
courage individuals from bringing these proceedings.
E. Eliminating Excessive Legal Fees
The current scheme which gives the court discretion to re-
duce legal fees it deems excessive is quite appropriate. 268 The
percentage system of compensation occasionally would award
greater fees than warranted if left unchecked by the court. 269
Often an hourly rate of payment is appropriate if little time and
effort were required during the proceeding, rather than a per-
centage of the estate.
In addition, attorneys should keep apprised of Article 81
procedure, and therefore should not charge the AIP for research
time. The Elder Law Section of the American Bar Association
often conducts seminars on Article 81 to educate attorneys on
how to participate as court evaluator, counsel or guardian in
Article 81 proceedings. Therefore, an attorney who wishes to
practice in this area should either be familiar with the statute
or refer the individual to a qualified Elder Law attorney, until
the time when he or she is properly educated.
Article 81 should be amended to give the court the discre-
tion to impose sanctions on attorneys who charge excessive
legal fees. Such sanctions will deter attorneys from charging
for research time or billing at an exorbitant rate. Hopefully,
this will prevent deceptive attorneys from taking advantage of
267. See also id. at 640-41, 645.
268. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw §§ 81.09(f), 81.10(g) and 81.28 (McKinney Supp.
1993). See also In re Franczoz, No. 24410-1-94 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1994),
reprinted in ADVANCED ISSUES IN GUARDIANSmP 70 (New York State Bar Ass'n
1995).
269. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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unsuspecting elders who have put, not only their faith, but also
their ultimate fate, in their attorneys.
F. Addressing the Problem of Indigence
The problem of indigence in Article 81 proceedings is one
that could potentially affect the lives of elders who cannot afford
to hire counsel to represent their interests. One possible solu-
tion to the problem of indigence is for the state to set aside
funds for the representation of impoverished AiPs. In re St.
Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center270 established that an indigent
AIP is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of counsel at
state expense when a petition seeks to appoint a guardian with
the power either to place an AIP in a nursing home or to make
major medical decisions. 271 The decision named the entity re-
sponsible for the payment of counsel to be the locality under
Article 18-b, rather than the state itself.2 7 2 Concerned individu-
als should lobby for amendments to laws such as Article 18-A
and B of the County Law273 and Article 81, so that a provision is
made specifically allocating funds for indigents in guardianship
proceedings.
Perhaps a seemingly radical change in Article 81 might suf-
ficiently address the problem of indigence. Article 81's provi-
sions for court evaluator and court-appointed counsel could be
entirely eliminated. 274 In their place, the statute could mandate
the appointment of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service for all in-
digents, as attorney.27 5 Under this scheme, the Probation De-
partment could play the role of court evaluator.27 6 Two
probation officers could be permanently assigned to the Guardi-
anship Part to do investigations, which the court, in its discre-
tion, might order.2 7 This program could be funded by filing
270. 159 Misc. 2d 932, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1993), aftd,
640 N.Y.S.2d 73 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), affd, No. 259, 1996 WL 730469 (N.Y. Dec.
20, 1996).
271. Id. at 939-40, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
272. See supra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
273. See N.Y. CoUNTY LAW §§ 18-A & 18-B (McKinney 1991).
274. See Letter from Charles F. Devlin, Esq. Principal Law Clerk, Tax Certio-
rari and Guardianship Parts, White Plains, N.Y. (August 6, 1996) (on file with the
Pace Law Review).
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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fees.278 If the petitioner is successful in obtaining guardianship,
these fees could be assessed against the estate of the AIP.
279 If
the petitioner is unsuccessful, the costs could be assessed
against the petitioner. 280
Additionally, the inequitable treatment among AIPs who
are indigent must also be addressed. There is differential treat-
ment regarding representation by the Mental Hygiene Legal
Service of AIPs residing in facilities as opposed to AiPs residing
in the community. Currently, if the AIP is a patient in a state
facility, a nursing home, adult home or hospital, the court can
appoint the Mental Hygiene Legal Service, which charges mini-
mal fees and serves for no fee in the case of indigence.28'
On the other hand, an indigent person residing in the com-
munity has practically no recourse. 28 2 The only occasion for re-
lief appears to be cases where the Human Resources
Administration of the City of New York is the petitioner, in
which it will pay a flat fee of $600 for the court evaluator's serv-
ices.28 3 Since these fact-specific circumstances arise quite infre-
quently, and there appears to be no reason for the disparity in
treatment of facility versus community residents, the expansion
of the appointment of the Mental Hygiene Legal Service to AIPs
residing in the community is necessary. Therefore, funds
should be allocated by the state for AiPs residing in the commu-
nity, and Article 81 should be amended accordingly.
G. Proposals to Decrease the Cost of Guardianship
Proceedings
The finding and implementation of ways to decrease the
cost of guardianship proceedings would be beneficial.284 The re-
quirement of a full hearing should be eliminated in cases where
the AIP is in a coma or is otherwise unable to communicate. A
278. Id.
279. See Letter from Charles F. Devlin, Esq. Principal Law Clerk, Tax Certio-
rari and Guardianship Parts, White Plains, N.Y. (August 6, 1996) (on file with the
Pace Law Review).
280. Id.
281. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.10(e); In re St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp.
Ctr., 159 Misc. 2d 932, 939-40, 607 N.Y.S.2d 574, 580.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra text accompanying notes 243-46.
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full hearing should also be eliminated when there is no substan-
tial dispute regarding the AIP's functional limitations. These
minor changes will not affect the procedural safeguards of the
statute and will make these proceedings less costly and time-
consuming.
IV. Conclusion
Guardianship proceedings under Article 81 have certainly
improved since the prior conservator and committee statutes
under Articles 77 and 78 were in force. Under Article 81, a
guardian's powers are limited specifically to the particular
needs of an incapacitated person for personal care, property and
financial management, or both, thereby ensuring "the least re-
strictive form of intervention" in the AIP's life. 285 However, de-
spite the improvements in the Mental Hygiene Law, some
problems remain.
The New York State Legislature might consider some of the
ideas discussed in this Comment for modifying Article 81. Arti-
cle 81 should be amended to ensure that when counsel for the
AIP is appointed, the court should dispense with the appoint-
ment of a court evaluator. Additionally, the mandatory ap-
pointment of counsel should be eliminated, except for situations
where the AIP contests the proceeding or specifically requests
counsel. Article 81 should also be amended to remove the re-
quirement of a full hearing when the AIP is unable to communi-
cate or when no dispute exists regarding the AiP's functional
limitations.
Furthermore, the present scheme of requesting an attorney
to represent indigent AiPs on a pro bono basis, with the intent
to compensate them in a subsequent proceeding is inade-
quate.286 Therefore, the statute should be amended to explicitly
delineate how court-appointed-counsel, court evaluator and
guardian are to be compensated when the AIP is indigent.
The inequitable treatment between indigent AIPs who live
in the community as opposed to those who reside in institutions
also needs to be addressed. Article 81 should be amended to
allow the Mental Hygiene Legal Service to be a resource, not
285. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.02 (a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
286. See Baifly II, supra note 34, at 277.
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only for AiPs who are institutionalized, but also for AIPs who
reside in the community. Furthermore, since an indigent AIP is
constitutionally entitled to the appointment of counsel at state
expense, Article 81 and Articles 18-A and 18-B of the County
Law should be amended so that funds can be specifically allo-
cated for such representation.
Finally, allowing courts the discretion of reducing legal fees
it deems excessive is quite appropriate. 2 7 Perhaps Article 81
can be amended to impose sanctions on attorneys when the
court determines that a fee is extremely excessive. Such sanc-
tions might deter lawyers from taking advantage of elderly cli-
ents in these proceedings.
In conclusion, with these minor changes in the statute,
AIPs will still receive the protections guaranteed under Article
81, yet the ultimate cost of these proceedings will be reduced.
Thus, the modifications will ensure that the AIP's assets will
not be unnecessarily depleted. Additionally, there will be less
uncertainty as to compensation for court evaluator, counsel,
and guardian, which will perhaps attract more professionals to
participate in these proceedings. If the New York State Legisla-
ture successfully achieves these modifications, Article 81 will
truly be "the least restrictive form of intervention which assists
[AIPs] in meeting their needs but, at the same time, permits
them to exercise the independence and self-determination of
which they are capable."288
Julie M. Solinski*
287. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 81.09(f), 81.10(g), and 81.28 (McKinney
Supp. 1993). See also In re Franczoz, No. 24410-1-94 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1994), reprinted in ADVANCED ISSUES IN GUARDIANSHIP 70 (New York State Bar
Ass'n 1995).
288. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAw § 81.03 (d) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
* This article is dedicated to Rose Mulligan-my Godmother, my Aunt, my
special friend, who passed away on February 20, 1997.
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